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During the 1960s, the Filipino industrial relations system has been undergoing 
a severe strain as evidenced by mounting labor disputes, an openly vocal and hostile 
labor movement-its resort to a people's strike, popularly known as the Welga ng 
Bayan method- and a very strong governmental move, inspired by the employers, to 
make the trade unions toe the line purportedly to bring about a speedy economic 
recovery and political stability. Amid a tense socio-economic environment, labor-
management relations became the focus of intense confrontation and debate in the 
legislative chambers and among employer groups. 
This paper describes and analyzes the recent FilipinO" experience in labor 
development and industrial relations. It traces the specific problems and issues which 
created the strain in labor-management relations. ln particular, the numerous 
pressures on the labor economy and the apparent absence of consensus in Philippine 
society are examined, and the impact of these on industrial relations is discussed. 
The changes in the labor policy framework ushered in by the new government 
are highlighted; the response of the labor movement to the new constitutionalism, the 
split of the labor movement several ways and the ideological drift of a major segment 
of organized labor are analyzed. Likewise, the response of employer organizations to 
the upsurge of union militancy is examined. Finally, the future directions of Filipino 
industrial relations are discussed. 
Introduction 
The recent upheavals in Philippine society have ushered in considerable 
impact on major aspects of the political economy. One of those heavily affected was 
the institution of trade unionism, its industrial relations strategy and ability to serve as a 
vehicle for the advancement of worker interest. In order to appreciate Philippine 
industrial relations today, one must review the performance of the labor economy, the 
political and legal changes which had taken place since 1986, and the primary issues 
which organized labor pursued throughout the decade of the 1980s. Moreover, the 
organizational and ideological proclivities of trade unions must be examined in light of 
various external pressures and the ramifications of these forces on the future of 
Filipino trade unionism and industrial relations. 
The Turning Point 
During the early 1950s, relative calm prevailed in the Philippine labor front. For 
one, the labor movement had to regoup after having been harassed and subjected to 
left-wing charges; for another, a major reorientation tool< place following the 
introduction of the American model of collective bargaining. The impact of these on 
labor was heavily felt. A void in the leadership of the labor movement became 
apparent as l<ey leaders were incarcerated; those who remained had a chance to fill 
the vacuum, but were too preoccupied with the mechanics and operations of collective 
bargaining, something that tool< some learning and getting used to. 
By the early 1960s, however, a period of disquiet started to emerge as some in 
the labor movement questioned the wisdom of applying the collective bargaining 
process in the Philippine labor market context where an abundant supply of labor 
I 
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existed and the limited capacity of industry to employ new entrants to the labor force 
tended to weaken labor's bargaining leverage. In the quest for a viable approach to 
the pursuit of worker interest, labor gradually gravitated towards political action. 
Eventually, a Workers Party (Lapiang Manggagawa) was formed to serve as labor's 
arm in the electoral process. 
The politicalization of the labor movement in the 1960s was not anything new. 
Organizers of the Workers Party linked labor's political agitation to the early struggles 
of the revolutionary secret society, Katipunan, which emerged in the 1890s to fight 
Spanish colonialism, with the peasant movement in the 1920s and 1930s and the Huk: 
movement of the 1940s and 1950s.1 Yet, the issues which prodded the formation of a 
labor party in 1963 were related to the labor problems of the day-- joblessness, low 
., 
pay and apparent lack: of participation in government decision-making. Labor also felt 
that the continuing control of the economy by the entrenched local elite in close 
alliance with foreign interests was ·disastrous to the working class.2 
These socio-economic conditions led to the rekindling of nationalism, as an 
emboldened organized labor, in alliance with the student movement and other interest 
groups, spearheaded the resurgence of the nationalist movement. With further 
organizing in the public sector, trade unions became even more agitated. By 1969, 
labor conflict reached an unprecedented level of over a million man-days lost followed 
by further increases in the next several years. Thus, for labor, 1969 proved to be the 
1 Elias T. Ramos, Philippine Labor Movement in Transition, New Day 
Publishers, 1976. Chapter 1, pp. 6-32. 
2 lbiQ., Chapter 3, pp. 33-80. 
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turning point of militancy in the postwar years. Its willingness to pursue its demands 
vigorously at the risk of cultivating the ire of the government was clearly established. 
In fact, strong measures were used by the government against labor after the normal 
machinery of disputes resolution failed in fostering consensus in industrial relations. 
Extent and Sources of Conflict 
Although the resurgence of political unionism in the mid-1960s was not 
sustained, its reappearance then was indicative of increasing assertiveness on the 
part of organized labor. The number of industrial disputes rose to over 100 and the 
number of workers involved in labor conflict reached nearly 62,000 in 1966. By 1969, 
man-days lost in the Philippines exceeded a million mark, a figure which policy-
., 
makers considered too high a price for a less developed economy. 
Against this backcrop, the 1970s ushered in a different context for trade unions. 
Like other groups in Philippine society, organized labor had become quite assertive as 
it pursued issues affecting the rank and file and the working class, as a whole. 
Consequently, the organizational factionalism and ideological divisions which 
normally characterized the Filipino labor movement were temporarily set aside in 
order for the major federations to be cohesive on fundamental issues, e.g. cost of 
living, foreign policy, negotiability of key economic items and, most of all, in resisting 
the employers' effort to undermine labor representation. The level of conflict rose 
sharply; by 1971, man-days idled nearly reached 1.5 million.3 The number of work 
3 Elias T. Ramos, "The Quest for Industrial Peace in the Philippines," in Social 
Tensions and Industrial Relations Arising in the Industrialization Processes of Asian 




stoppages increased to 157 although the extent of worker participation in overt conflict 
did not increase by very much than the 1966 figure. In 1972, the number of work 
stoppages dropped considerably to 69 but the number of man-days lost stayed well 
over the million mark despite a ban on strikes after September 21, 1972 due to the 
martial law imposed that year. Table 1 below summarizes the incidents of labor 
conflict over a ten-year period. 
Table 1. Work Stoppages jn the Philippines. 1963-72 
Year Stoppages Workers Involved Man-Days Lost 
1963 88 47,520 /454,937 
1964 100 69,109 839,446 
1965 109 54,944 794,185 
1966 108 61 ,496 756,257 
1967 88 47,524 696,890 
1968 121 ' 46,445 584,498 
1969 122 62,603 1,066,642 
1970 104 36,652 994,689 
1971 157 62,138 1 ,429,195 
1972* 69 33,369 1,003,646 
*Up to September 1972 only. Taken from various sources and reproduced from 
E.T. Ramos, "The Quest for Industrial Peace in the Philippines," in Social Tensions and 
Industrial Relations Arising in the Industrialization Processes of Asian Countries. 
Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labour, 1979. p. 194. 
The intensification of industrial conflict in the Philippines during the early '70s may 
have been a clear manifestation of the g-owing alienation of workers in the midst of 
increasing economic uncertainty. This agitation contributed, undoubtedly, to the 
promulgation of martial law in 1972 as the Marcos government became overly 
concerned about the implications of worker militancy. Although not entirely its own 
doing, trade unions were, nevertheless, blamed for the undue rise of public militancy 
that year. As a consequence, labor organizations were subjected to severe restraints: 
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outspoken union leaders were selectively picked up for questioning and incarceration, 
the right to strike was suspended, and the behavior of other key personalities in the 
labor front was watched very closely by the authorities. Some unionists stayed behind 
bars for several years and upon release had to report to the authorities regularly; they 
were further mandated to refrain from active involvement in labor affairs. 
Organizational Autonomy 
Experiences in other developing countries suggest that stringent government 
actions could lead to either the total subjugation or demise of the labor movement. 4 
On this basis, policies put forward by governments have become a major ingredient of 
industrial relations in these countries.s In some countries, the labor movement serves 
as an extension of the state, virtually coopted and mobilized as an instrument of state 
corporatism. a In these places true trade unionism, as known in the West, is non-
existent, although the form and symbols are there. Sometimes, trade unions function 
4 See Elias T. Ramos, "The Labor Movement in Taiwan," unpublished 
monograph, 1969. Asian Labor Education Center, University of the Philippines; 
Michael A Launius, "The State and Industrial Labor in Korea," Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars, V. 16 No.4, 1984, pp. 2-10. 
5 Basu Sharma, Aspects of Industrial Relations in ASEAN. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Occasional Paper No. 78, 1985. 
6 Frederic C. Deyo, Dependent Development and Industrial Order: An Asian 
Case Study. Praeger, 1981; Barry Wilkinson and Chris Leggett, "Human and 
Industrial Relations in Singapore: The Management of Compliance." Euro-Asia 
Business Review. V. 4 No.3, July 1985, PP. 9-15. 
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primarily as "transmission belts" for state policies;? in other cases, the labor movement 
crifts toward welfare activities for organizational survival purposes.s 
Although not exceptionally unique even by Asian standards, the Filipino labor 
movement has shown a great deal of muscle in resisting the combined pressures of 
government and large, influential employers. Instead of capitulating, organized labor 
remained autonomous and persisted to perform its role faithfully both at the bargaining 
table and in the political arena to the extent that it could influence political 
developments. As a consequence, the labor movement became even more polarized 
with the left gaining a great deal of ground. Many independent local and federated 
organizations gradually disaffiliated from the government-sponsored and supported 
Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) and instead aligned with ttre 
independent groups. Hence, when the left-wing Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) or May 
First Movement, was formed in 1980, many sympathetic unions and federations readily 
embraced its ideology. Judging from the number of federations which became charter 
members of the KMU, the majority of labor federations became openly aitical of the 
government's posture and its attempt to make unions toe the line. 
Philippine labor's relative success in maintaining organizational autonomy 
despite strong pressure from the government may be attributed to the following factors: 
first, it has a strong tradition in maintaining an organizational solidarity since its 
7 June Hearn, "Whither the Trade Unions in China," The Journal of Industrial 
Relations, June 1977 pp. 158-172. 
8 Pang Eng Fong, "Singapore." International Handbook of Industrial Relations: 
Contemporary Developments and Research. Greenwood Press, 1981. 
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inception in the 1890s; second, it serves as an avenue for politicians to cultivate 
relationships with pressure groups including labor, a phenomenon which trade unions 
exploit when confronted with adverse developments; third, organized labor functions 
as a "little patron" in an environment of the patron-client system; and finally, unions are 
concentrated in the modern sector of the economy, particularly in multinational 
enterprises.9 
An Attempt at Cooptation 
The curtailment of the right to concerted activities over a 1 0-year period of 
martial law (1972-81) constituted a major blow to Philippine {abor. As mentioned, 
many leaders were detained; others were placed under surveillance. Because work 
stoppages were banned, the Labor Ministry served as organized labor's guardian by 
approving or disapproving any lay-off and disciplinary cases and in making sure that 
trade unions did not stage illegal walkouts. Between 1973 and 1975, no strikes were 
reported although numerous complaints were settled by the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment (MOLE) and the newly-created National Labor Relations Commission 
(NLRC), a tripartite body which was formed for the sole purpose of resolving labor 
disputes. After restraining militant labor action,10 then President Ferdinand Marcos 
issued a decree revising several major provisions of the 1953 Industrial Peace Act and 
consolidating it with all other existing social and labor legislation into a single but 
9 Elias T. Ramos, "Filipino Trade Unions and Multinationals," in Foreign 
Investment and Labor in Asian Countries. Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labour, 1976. 
pp. 72-85. 
1 o General Order No. 5 (September 22, 1972) & Presidential Decree No. 21 
(October 14, 1972). 
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comprehensive Labor Code.11 The new labor code substantially drifted away from the 
"quest for industrial peace" principle established earlier as the fundamental organizing 
focus of labor relations and moved towards a redefinition of labor's role in the context 
of economic development as outlined by and in consonance with the goals of the New 
Society.12 The new code mandated unions to act as "agents of democracy, social 
justice and development."13 
Cooptation of the labor movement was further worked out through a program of 
organizational restructuring. Under the aegis of the MOLE, a segment of Philippine 
labor initiated the formation of a national center for the purpose of minimizing inter-
union rivalries which Labor Ministry officials fingered as the principal source of strikes. 
The effort initially led to the formation of the Philippine National Trade Union Center 
(PNTUC) under the leadership of the late National Mines and Allied Workers' Unions 
(NAMAWU) Roy Padilla in April 1974.14 The conspicuous absence of representatives 
from larger federations and the Labor Ministry at the convention led many to conclude 
that the government disapproved the formation of PNTUC. This was confirmed about 
two years later when the TUCP was launched with the blessings of the government. 
As the Labor Ministry's duly approved labor center, TUCP provided the 
11 Presidential Decree No. 442 (May 1, 1974). 
12 Ferdinand E. Marcos, Today's Revolution: Democracy, 1971. See Chapter 
6, "The New Society." 
13 Presidential Decree No. 442, Book V, Chapter 1, Article 259. 
14 Padilla was killed in early 1988 while campaigning for governor of 
Camarines Norte province. 
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collaboration sought by the government However, the collaboration that the 
government obtained was only partial largely because several major federations. e.g. 
the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) and the Federation of Free 
Workers (FFW). shied away from the TUCP umbrella. Also. a few initial signatories 
seceded from TUCP not long after its formation and formed separate labor centers. 
Eventually, the role that TUCP was supposed to provide in accepting the blessings of 
the government became. at best. symbolic in nature. Although TUCP claimed to have 
the largest membership of any grouping, in reality the proportion of organized workers 
outside its umbrella was much larger. 
The situation polarized the competing centers and further intensified the 
divisions in the labor movement which then Labor Minister Bias Ople tried to avoid. 
Hence. after a few years, over half a dozen centers openly vied for national 
prominence marking the failure of the government's move to form a single national 
confederation of labor. With seven national centers listed in the government's roster in 
1985, plus those not listed despite their strong physical presence, Philippine labor 
was far more divided at the beginning of 1986 than in 1972 when the restructuring 
program started!15 Developments since 1986, including the launching of a series of 
Welga nq Bayan (or People's Strike) in which both the left and the right-wing 
segments of labor movement participated, did not draw labor any closer. In sum. the 
restructuring program did not achieve the desired goal of unification; instead, it 
polarized organized labor further. 
15 "Trade Union Directory of the Philippines," Volume II. Manila: Institute of 
Labor and Manpower Services and Bureau of Labor Relations. Ministry of Labor and 
Employment, November, 1983. PP. 269-271. 
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Ideological Positioning 
The split within the major ranks of organized labor in the Philippines was a 
phenomenon that showed up before and after the second World War. In the postwar 
period beginning in 1954, there have been serious attempts to form national centers 
for the purpose of bringing about a united labor front. The restructuring program 
during the Marcos years was chiefly designed to unify labor; however, as noted above, 
that effort failed also. Arguably, it was perhaps due to either the existing ideological 
gap between federations and labor centers that unity became very elusive or as a 
consequence of the failed governmental unity effort, the ide61ogical chasm between 
major ranks of organized labor widened. In any case, some peasant groups, e.g. the 
Katipunan (or Society), have visibly positioned at the extreme left followed very closely 
by KMU. At the left of center was the Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied 
Services (TUPAS) while the Catholic-oriented FFW stabilized its foothold at the center. 
True to its background and leadership preference, TUCP is the epitome and, perhaps, 
the classic example of right-wing unionism in the Philippines. Within each major 
center, affiliated unions tended to be somewhat spread within a range of positions 
under the over-all umbrella of the national center, e.g. the KMU includes several major 
federations which are quite moderate and, therefore, not necessarily as extremely 
radical as KMU is perceived to be.16 
In general, Philippine society does not provide any easy way to delineate the 
philosophical orientation of existing groups apart from the leadership. Like other 
16 Interview with Ibarra Malonzo, president of the National Federation of Labor, 
an affiliate of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), December 17, 1987. 
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social and political groups in Philippine society, unions carry the same character. A 
labor federation's position in the ideological spectrum is principally a function of 
leadership preference, although in several instances, e.g. Katipunan and, to a degree 
KMU, the preponderance of left-leaning people at the periphery of the organizational 
roster chiefly accounts for the ideological extremism of these organizations. 17 
In the case of TUCP at the extreme right, the leadership phenomenon gives the 
ultimate clue to its position. Its former leader, the late Roberto Oca, was an elitist 
waterfront labor leader whose personality thrived best in confrontation with employers 
and the government, but he made no bones about his strong' acceptance of the 
system. His successor, Democrito Mendoza, a lawyer, and associates Cecilio and 
Januario Seno, also lawyer and accountant, represented stevedores and pier hands 
in an entrepreneurial way in the port city of Cebu in central Philippines. After building 
up a union called Associated Labor Union (ALU) and gaining the confidence of then 
Manila's south harbor strong man Oca, the Mendoza-Sene group extended its 
operations to Manila initially to service unorganized workers particularly in the textile 
industry. Eventually, Oca's Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization 
(PTGWO) and Mendoza's ALU closed ranks and became the mainstay of TUCP 
although several federations and national unions bolstered TUCP's claim to being the 
biggest single national center.1B The government's endorsement certainly boosted 
17 Ibid. 
18 For several years now, ALU has been TUCP's mainstay (PTGWO broke up 
into the Andres Dinglasan faction which stayed with TUCP and the Oca faction, which 
left TUCP). Because of this, Mendoza makes known often that he might pull out ALU 
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TUCP's image; as a result, TUCP monopolized labor's representation in government 
agencies and in the ILO annual conventions in Geneva. The majority of unionized 
workers, most of whom were bunched up at the left of the political spectrum, were not 
represented in the aforementioned bodies simply because they refused to affiliate with 
TUCP. 
Obviously, the blessings of the government in those representations were the 
most important ingredient on the side of TUCP. In addition, the assistance provided by 
the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI), which started its program in the 
Philippines in the late '60's, helped prop up TUCP. Both OC"A's and Mendoza's 
unions were recipients of generous financial help from AAFLI.19 During the martial law 
regime, Ople sought to channel foreign fund assistance to unions through the Labor 
Ministry and used it as a bait for other labor federations to come across. Thus, TUCP 
became the sole beneficiary of AAFLI's funds since, like its parent AFL-CIO, AAFLI 
discriminated against unions whose political preference did not agree with that of the 
late George Meany's straight-forward, apolitical, "bread and butter" unionism. 
Due to the control the Labor Ministry placed on the distribution of foreign union 
fund assistance and due to the monopoly that TUCP had on AAFLI funds, other labor 
federations looked elsewhere for counterpart funds. The search for other sources of 
from this center. Also, as of December 1987, TUCP could not document its claim to 
being the "largest labor center" in the Philippines. Several of its affiliated federations 
have become paper unions but do remain there largely because of the support which 
AAFLI provides. 
19 Julie Q. Casel, a report on the financial status of labor federations in the 
Philippines, University of the Philippines School of Labor and Industrial Relations, 
December 1987. 
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union assistance money further deepened polarization within the labor movement. 
The FFW continued to rely on the Brotherhood of Asian Trade Unionists (BATU) as the 
channel of training funds from the Belgium-based World Congress of Labour (WCL). 
Other unions went to Germany's Ebert Stiftung; TUPAS, which was not known for its 
ideological commitment, suddenly became an affiliate of the World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WFTU). KMU's core affiliate, the late Felixberto Olalia's National 
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), was associated with WFTU much earlier. 
Likewise, the white-collar militant union, National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), 
founded and led by Ignacio Lacsina until1972 (NATU broke'up into two factions after 
Lacsina's incarceration), was also a WFTU affiliate. Additionally, the National 
Federation of Labor (formerly Mindanao Federation of Labor, MFL) received grants 
from the World Council of Christian Churches.2o Several Filipino unions, e.g. United 
Lumber and General Workers (ULGW) and the Confederation of Garment and Textile 
Workers (COGTEX) were known to have received generous grants from Japanese 
unions.21 Similarly, a number of labor education training centers organized between 
the late 1970s and early 1980s have received generous grants from a variety of 
external funding agencies and have aided in the cultivation of stronger union 
consciousness in the Philippines.22 
What these developments suggest is that foreign assistance on trade union 
20 Ibid. 
21 Conversation with officials of the Japanese Council of Trade Unions 
(SOHYO) in Tokyo, March 1983. 
22 Interview with Bishop Madriaga in Cebu City, November 1987. 
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activity became a major source of ideological rift between segments of the Philippine 
labor movement. To this day, the AAFLI has not changed its policy of assisting only 
conservative unions; thus TUCP continues to be its channel of whatever it stands for in 
the Philippines.23 While this policy has kept some national unions and federations 
within the TUCP framework, it has also caused others to shy away from it. Moreover, 
AAFLI funds have become a major source of irritation between TUCP and other trade 
union bodies. 
Adverse Labor Market Conditions 
The status of Filipino organized labor today, its weak/bargaining posture and 
increased tendency towards political action may be appreciated in light of existing 
labor market conditions. In the first place, the lack of growth in industrial employment 
made it difficult for collective bargaining to have a sound base. Between 1960 and 
1983, for example, industrial employment in the Philippines grew only marginally; as a 
proportion of the labor force, employment in industry actually declined from nearly 16 
percent in 1970 to only 13 percent in 1983, a trend not found anywhere else in Asia. 
At the end of 1985, industrial employment was proportionately worse off having 
declined to 11 percent. As of the end of 1987, agricultural employment in the 
Philippines continued to account for about 50 percent of the labor force; the service 
sector expanded to over 32 percent leaving industry at a near standstill.24 
Because collective bargaining thrives best in the industrial sector, the economic 
23 Interview with Donald Phillips, then director of the Asian-American Free 
Labor Institute in Manila, on July 18, 1986. 
24 I LO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1987. 
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thrust of trade unionism was severely limited. The sectoral distribution of the Filipino 
labor force explains to a geat extent why, despite impressive gains in union 
membership, the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements 
represents an insignificant minority. As of 1985, only some 266,537 workers were 
covered by negotiated contracts.2s In contrast, the membership of the entire trade 
union movement that year was reported as 4.78 million workers. This meant that less 
that six (5.6) percent of all trade union members directly benefited from the collective 
bargaining system; a situation which explicitly attested to the miserable failure of 
collective bargaining as a system of wage determination in the Philippine context 
despite claims to the contrary.26 This awkward situation left most labor unions no 
choice except to engage in overt political activities. Peasants, agricultural hands and 
service sector employees, including those in government payrolls, used their 
organizations to obtain political influence anywhere and however they could get it. In 
these efforts, labor mobilized a variety of ways to make its point. A distinct method was 
the establishment of interunion alliances by provinces and regions, e.g. the Workers 
Alliance in Region 3 (WAR3) covering the labor alliances in the provinces of Bataan, 
25 It is possible that this figure might be understated slightly since unions are 
not required to submit the exact number of employees covered, according to former 
Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez and National Federation of Labor's Ibarra A. 
Malonzo in interviews with the author July 22 and July 24, 1986, respectively. 
26 Ibarra A. Malonzo, "Trade Unions as Participatory Agents in Philippine 




Bulacan and Pampanga.27 Another popular method is the staging of mass sickouts, 
demonstrations and rallies, and, as mentioned, the welga ng bayan strategy. 
Resurgence of Political Unionism 
As a new strategy, worker alliances emerged as a joint action at the Export 
Processing Zone in Bataan when the various unions in the area staged a zone-wide 
strike against the foreign multinationals operating there. The success of the alliance at 
BEPZ encouraged numerous local unions elsewhere to emulate the strategy and to 
combine efforts irrespective of federation affiliation. Worker/alliances were organized 
in Mindanao, the Visayas, southern Luzon and in metro Manila. These alliances then 
became an important ingedient of the industrial relations landscape although these 
groupings represented a radical departure from Philippine labor's traditional 
organizational approach.2B In many ways, the growth of the alliances clearly shows 
how organized labor utilizes other means of action whenever collective bargaining 
fails. According to a KMU official, "How can labor rely on collective bargaining when 
the economy itself is down? There is nothing to bargain for anyway!"29 
It was in this context that worker alliances emerged. It was deemed as an 
answer to the problems labor faced within the context of martial rule. Many local 
27 Business Day November 4, 1985. p. 31. 
28 "Workers Alliances: Expression of Worker's heightened Militancy," 
Philippine Labor Monitor. Institute for Labor Research and Documentation. 1 :2, 2nd 
Quarter, 1985. pp. 53-76. 
29 Interview with Roberto Ortaliz, secretary-general of the Kilusang Mayo Uno, 
Honolulu, Hawaii, April 1986. 
/ 
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unions felt the need for alternative forms of labor solidarity largely because existing 
labor federations and centers had become virtually impotent. Constrained by 
numerous government rules, many labor federations abdicated their responsibility to 
the local unions; consequently, multiple disaffiliations took place. Rank and file 
unionists felt that keeping their organizational ties with labor federations merely 
subjected them to exploitation and extortion via the compulsory collection of union 
dues despite the lack of adequate services.so Alternatively, local unions thought that 
forming regional alliances among themselves could reinforce their attempt to carry on 
without federation support. 
Because of the evident strong movement of grassroots unionists and the broad 
support of concerned citizens and cause-oriented groups, which sprouted in the 1980s 
originally to help topple the Marcos dictatorship, manifestations of labor coalitions 
became very common in recent years, a phenomenon which bolstered the cause of 
political unionism, i.e., the mobilization of strategies designed to enhance the ability of 
the labor movement to pursue its goals and objectives by mobilizing rallies, 
demonstrations and mass walkouts.31 
For a while, broad regional coalitions of local unions threatened the very 
existence of major labor centers, and to this day it still does. But as recent events 
indicate, instead of frowning on these grassroots movement, labor federations realized 
the necessity of a political action that emanates from below as a substitute to the failed 
30 Interview with Ibarra A. Malonzo, Quezon City, October 1983. 
31Adolf Sturmthal, "Industrial Relations Strategies," in International Labor 
Movement in Transitions. University of Illinois Press, 1973. pp. 
I 
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attempts in the past which were initiated from the top, e.g. the Laoianq Manggagawa. 
As a result, in addition to the KMU affiliates. many federations supported the broadly-
based worker alliances-thus lending political unionism a new structural foundation 
and encouragement. 
The most visible signs of political unionism in the 1980s were bared in 1987 
and 1988 through the series of Welga ng Bayan (People's Strikes). At first, the Welga 
nq Bayan was largely supported by unions of jeepney drivers especially because the 
main issue was labor's call for a drastic rollback of the price of oil. Eventually, with a 
set of broader issues, e.g. the upgrading of the minimum wage rate. the movement 
received the support of both left-wing and right-wing unions. and the public at large. 
Other manifestations of political unionism were labor's support in the formation 
'-
of a left-wing political party, the Partido ng Bayan (People's Party) in 1986. Then KMU 
chairman. Rolando Olalia. became the head of the People's Party--a phenomenon 
which may have triggered his assassination later that year; nevertheless, the Partido 
nq Bayan persisted and had a few candidates elected later to Congress. 
In explaining the resurgence of political unionism in the Philippines in the 
1980s, it is not enough to cite the phenomena of the worker alliances, the Welga ng 
Bayan and labor's weak bargaining posture. The context of relatively indifferent. if not 
outright oppressive, political system to the welfare of the working class and the 
unfavorable labor market conditions must be considered equally. In fact, following 
Professor Adolf Sturmthal, the labor market environment outweighs any other factor in 
I 
labor's eventual decision to mobilize an alternative industrial relations strategy.32 
In particular, one must look at the large size of unemployment and 
underemployment in the Philippines to understand the significance of labor's 
ideological drift in recent years. While official figures estimate unemployment at 
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around 11 percent, in actuality the unemployment rates for urban areas go as high as 
20 to 25 percent. Since underemployment is also estimated to be around 18 to 20 
percent nationwide, the problem is exacerbated if the full-time equivalent is computed 
and the balance added to the unemployment data.33 In the Philippine labor economy, 
these figures would likely sum up to an effective underemploYment rate of 30 percent 
and perhaps nearly 20 percent unemployment rate out of a labor force of 22 million.34 
To the extent that a huge pool of labor remains unoccupied, alienation and discontent 
of this group spills over to the employed whose ability to improve their plight through 
the collective bargaining process is constrained by existing labor market conditions 
and policies which inhibit labor's independent action. 
32 Ibid. See also Elias T. Ramos, "Industrial Relations Strategies of Trade 
Unions in Southeast Asia." Agenda for Industrial Relations in Asian Development. 
Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labour, 1981. pp.; Solomon B. Levine, "Japanese 
Trade Unionism as a Model in Economic Development." National Labor Movements 
in the Postwar World ed. by E. M. Kassalow. Northwestern University Press, 1963. pp. 
185-203. 
33 Rosa Linda Tidalgo, "Labor Absorption in the Philippines, 1956-73." The 
Philippine Economic Journal, XV:1&2, 1976. p. 186. See also Farhad Mehran, 
"Employment Data for Measurement of Living Standards." World Bank, October 1980. 
14 pp. 
34 Philippine Statistical Yearbook 1987. National Economic Development 
Authority, Manila. August, 1987. p. 472. 
Additionally, the degree to which rising prices negated the gains in workers' 
real income enhanced the possibilities for political unionism in the Philippines in 
recent years. Between 1978 and mid-1984, for instance, the consumer price index 
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nearly tripled; the highest inaeases have been mostly notable in basic necessities like 
fuel, light and water which showed more than 300 percent inaeases.3s Between 1980 
and 1983 the inflation rate averaged 15 percent annually, but by 1984 this rate jumped 
to over 50 percent sending shock waves all over the place. Although the inflation rate 
dropped to 25 percent in 1985,36 the trend did not save the country from the worst 
economic disaster since World War 11.37 Available data for 1,988 indicate that the 
economy has improved but inflation at nearly 1 0 percent took back whatever money 
wage gains were made by the Filipino workers following the P10 inaease in 
December 1987 made possible by the revision of the minimum wage rate. 
Compounding the massive economic problem was the huge layoffs during most 
of the 1980s, e.g. 78,466 in 1981; 44,362 in 1982; 75,000 in 1983; 93,000 in 1984; 
and 61,986 in 1985.38 The immediate reasons for these layoffs were the lack of raw 
materials arising from the US$28 billion foreign debt the Philippines had incurred and 
35 PhilipPine Statistical Yearbook 1984. National Economic Development 
Authority, Manila. p. 156. 
36 Foolden Times Philippines Yearbook 1984-85, p. 120. 
37 Dante B. Canlas, et al. "An Analysis of the Philippine Economic Crisis: A 
Workshop Report." School of Economics, University of the Philippines, June 1984, 
171 pp. Mimeographed. 
38 Business Day, January 2, 1986, p, 6. 
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the erosion of confidence in the discredited Marcos administration. Substantial 
amounts of capital left the country due to the atmosphere of political uncertainty 
following the assassination of Ninoy Aquino on August 21, 1983; the change of 
government in 1986 and the apparent recovery of the Philippines since then has not 
fully induced much of those capital to return to the country. 
The runaway inflation which hit the Philippines in the 1980s fueled the clamor of 
workers for substantial wage adjustments to a point where a serious confrontation 
loomed large in the horizon by 1984. The clamor produced some political response 
as wage orders were issued to provide for much-needed incbme adjustments. By 
1985, the minimum wage rate reached about P50 a day including cost of living 
allowances. The adjustments were, however, not substantial enough to offset the rise 
in the consumer price index. The purchasing power of the Philippine peso went down 
to 28 centavos between 1978 to 1986.39 Moreover, its exchange rate fell to P20 per 
US$1, and presently fluctuating between P21 and P22 per US$1. In other words, 
what industrial workers received in 1951 at the rate of P4 a day (equivalent to US$2 
then) improved only slightly since P50 in 1986 translated to only US$2.50, or an 
improvement of 50 cents in a period of 35 years! The integrated minimum basic pay 
estimated at P57 per day in July 1986 was only equivalent to $2.85 representing an 
annual average improvement of 2.4 cents in the daily wage of Filipino workers. Under 
these conditions even the relatively hefty wages increase made possible by the 1987 
and 1989 amendments to the minimum wage law- which provided for P10 and P25 
39 Business Day, January 6, 1986, p. 8; 1986 Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 




daily wage increases respectively -- did not improve the real income of Filipino 
workers. In fact, a major justification for the 1987 and 1989 minimum wage increases 
was to catch up with the rapidly rising prices.40 



































































Sources: 1981 Yearbook of Labor Statistics. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 
Manila, Philippines; ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1985, p. 868; Business Day 
(Manila), various issues is 1985 & 1986; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 
1986, pp. 54-56; Manila Bulletin, various issues, 1986; Labor Statistics Service, 
Ministry of Labor & Employment, "Comparative Statistics on Actual Strikes, 1985 and 
1986;" BusinessWorld, November 14, 1988. 
40 Elias T. Ramos, "Toward a Viable Wage Policy," The Manila Chronicle, 
October 15 and 16, 1987. p. 5 respectively. 
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Additionally, violations of the prescribed minimum wage rate are rampant in 
both industrial and agricultural sectors. In the provinces of Negros, for example, many 
sugar industry field hands often received only P1 Q-P15 a day41 while in the rattan 
industry of Cebu, many workers got paid only P18 a day despite the existence in 1987 
of a P53 daily minimum wage.42 In fact, minimum wage violations have become a 
major cause of strikes. 
The statistics above clearly show that the rise of labor conflict is, in general, 
correlated with the worsening crisis of the political economy. At the micro-level, the 
/ 
specific causes of labor disputes in recent years have not been too sharply different 
from those in the past, i.e, non-implementation of minimum wage order guidelines, 
unfair labor practices,' violation of the existing collective bargaining agreements, 
contract renewals and, often, union rivalry whenever another union is formed in the 
plant. During the 1983-86 period, dismissal and lay-off cases have triggered 
widespread strikes as the workers tried to hang-on to their jobs. In addition, 
harassment and, sometimes, dismissal and suspension of union officers and members 
have caused numerous strikes. Overall, labor conflict in the Philippines in recent times 
has been heightened by feelings of relative deprivation and a growing rank and file 
awareness to find new avenues for the expression of worker protest. 
In comparison with some of her neighbors, the Philippines appears to be the 
41 Interview with lsabelo "Biloy" Amato, an organizer of the sugar workers 
union, in Bais, Negros Oriental on July 21, 1986. 
42 Interview with members and officers of the Cebu Rattan Workers Union, 




most strike-prone country in the region during the 1980s, a further testament to the 
problems of the Philippine economy lately. Evidently, the worsened economic 
situation sparked numerous strikes some against lay-offs, others to secure compliance 
to the minimum wage standards and attempts by workers to minimize the erosion of 
real income. While the 1987 and 1988 data do show some decline in the man-days 
lost, th-e number of work stoppages and workers involved remains quite high and is 
expected to be so for sometime unless the economy rapidly improves and/or the 
workers' real income rises dramatically in the next few years. 
Changing Framework of Labor Relations? 
The change in government on February 26, 1986 created an ideal opportunity 
for revising the labor relations framework considered to be oppressive. As of 1988, 
however, except for a few minor changes, the framework of Filipino labor relations 
remained basically the sam; as was promulgated by the Labor Code of 1974. In 
broad terms, although the 1987 Philippine Constitution introduced the concept of 
equal partnership between laba and management, this notion is yet to be fully 
recognized and implemented. Likewise, President Cory Aquino's initial promise to 
drastically bring about social justice and to reaffirm the workers' freedom of 
association has been put in place but there are many questions related to its 
implementation. Hence, halfway the term of the present government, labor still 
remains somewhat alienated despite a fairly good upgrading of the minimum wage 
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rate in December 1987 and June 1989.43 
The changes that the Aquino administration introduced consist mainly of rules 
related to the strilce vote-from two-thirds vote to simple majority. reduction in the 
proportion of bargaining unit members who could petition to organize or decertify a 
union, initiating an agreement between labor and management through a Code of 
Harmony and, as the Constitution provides, allowing public sector employees to 
exercise the right to self-organization including collective bargaining and concerted 
action. New amendments to the 1974 Labor Code have been passed by Congress 
and a wage rationalization act approved to decentralize futufe minimum wage 
adjustments.44 Public sector employees have, however, been still prevented from 
exercising the right to strilce despite the Constitutional provisions. As far as providing 
for adequate labor representation in Congress and in government bodies. the new 
administration has waivered between giving labor a free ride particularly the left-wing 
segment and carefully avoiding adequate encouragement to the left-wing segment of 
the labor movement, an approach that has made it difficult lately for the government to 
establish full rapport with the Filipino working class as a whole. 
43 Rigoberto Tiglao, "Unions Ram Minimum Wage Rise Through Congress: 
Muscle Flexing," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 29, 1989. pp. 12-13. 
44 Republic Act No. 6715, "1989 Amendments to the Labor Code," approved 
March 2, 1989; Republic Act No. 6727, "Wage Rationalization Act," approved June 9, 
1989 (See Vicente B. Foz, ed. 1) The Labor Code of the Philippines and Its 
Implementing Regulations. 1989 First Edition. Philippine Law Gazette, 1989. 
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Concluding Observations 
Philippine labor today is much more assertive, ideologically divided and 
organizationally factionalized. While a great deal of regrouping took place in the 
1980s especially as more and more labor unions affiliated with the left-wing KMU, 
many unions have also disaffiliated from the right-wing TUCP, and formed separate 
centers. As new local unions were organized, the competition between established 
and newly-formed labor federations became intense; likewise, the competition 
between KMU and TUCP remained at its peak despite some"amount of getting 
together during the October 1987 Welga ng Bayan and those of 1988 and 1989. 
A major development during the 1980s was the formation of a highly politicized 
-, 
labor movement. Among the factors that contributed to this phenomenon were the 
ideological division between the major segments of the labor movement, the formation 
of grassroots worker alliances by regions and labor markets. the continuing adverse 
labor market conditions, erosion of workers real income and the feeling of relative 
deprivation. On account of the above, perhaps, the future course of Filipino industrial 
relations appears difficult to predict. While the level of confrontation seems to be 
declining, the level of conflict is still very high and may be expected to remain high for 
sometime. Also, the rank and file may be expected to pursue labor's basic goals with 
or without the assistance of the established, federated groups simply because the cost 
of affiliation is considered to be too high economically-on account of low rank and file 
income--and politically, due to ineffective representation. 
The splits that characterized several well-known federations and the attempts in 
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early 1987, following the ratification of the Constitution, to form new labor groups in the 
private as well as public sectors45 indicate that the prevailing federation structure 
tends to be undermined in favor of giving more expression to working class demands. 
If this trend continues for the next several years, the structural foundation of existing 
labor organizations may undergo some major change. The metamorphosis of militant 
rank and file-dominated organizations is a likely scenario. However, due to the 
persistence of established professional leadership in the Philippine labor movement, 
the federated organizational structure is not going to self-destruct easily, but its 
continuation hinges largely on its ability to attract foreign aid/and on its assumption of 
new advisory roles including a wide range of legal and political representation. The 
line leadership drawn from the rank and file may be expected to assert itself more and 
more in the near future and, perhaps, also push for a redefinition of staff roles for 
professional hangers-on. 
If and when the above scenario takes place, industrial relations in the 
Philippines will generate a tendency to become less legalistic in nature but perhaps 
more political in orientation. Eventually, the functional prerequisites of sound 
industrial relations strategies will be recognized. 
Finally, as the events of the 1980s indicate, Filipino workers have reaffirmed, 
and will perhaps continue to do so, the use of a dualistic industrial relations strategy in 
which trade unions are seen as performing the functions of a bargaining agent at the 
45 Interview with Ramon T. Jimenez, president of the Philippine Industrial 
Relations Association, February 11 and 12, 1987, and July 1987. According to 
Jimenez, the possibility of "a centrist, apolitical alternative" to surface in a new era of 
Philippine labor is very likely in the future. As of November 1989, however, this has 
not happened; rather, the left-wing faction has grown in size. 
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plant level and as a political machine at the macro-level seeking to represent workers 
who, on account of adverse labor market conditions and/or organizational fragility, fail 
to benefit from the collective bargaining process.46 The opening up of the political 
process concommitant with the drastic change in the structure and philosophy of the 
present government provides additional avenues for organized labor to drift further 
towards political action. 
/ 
46 See Elias T. Ramos, Philippine Labor Movement in Transition. New Day 
Publishers, 1976. p. 104 and a forthcoming book, now in press, Dualistic Unionism 
and Industrial Relations, New Day Publishers. 
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